event the difference between the two estimates. In the direct approach participants estimate each event's likelihood in their future as compared to someone else's future (i.e., relative likelihood estimates). Comparative optimism is defined as reporting that one is more likely than others to experience desirable events and less likely than others to experience undesirable events. Using primarily the direct method, hundreds of studies have documented comparative optimism (for reviews see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Shepperd et al., 2002) , encouraging the view that it characterizes the way people generally think about the future.
Although demonstrations of comparative optimism appear in hundreds of studies, considerable evidence suggests that comparative optimism is not as ubiquitous as commonly believed. For example, numerous studies find comparative optimism for controllable events but not for uncontrollable events (for reviews see Harris, 1996; Klein & Helweg-Larsen, Comparative optimism 4 2002) . Other research suggests that personal experience with an undesirable events diminishes comparative optimism for that event (e.g., Covey & Davies, 2004; Harris, 2007; HelwegLarsen, 1999; Higgins et al., 1997) . Finally, whether people show comparative optimism for an event depends on the underlying base rate for the event. For desirable events, people typically show comparative optimism when the event is common but not, or to a lesser degree, when the event is rare. Conversely, for undesirable events, people typically show comparative optimism when the event is rare but not, or to a lesser degree, when the event is common (Covey & Davies, 2004; Klar, Medding, & Sarel, 1996; Madey & Gomez, 2003; Nezlek & Zebrowski, 2001; Price, Pentecost, & Voth, 2002; Weinstein, 1980 Weinstein, , 1987 Whalen, Henker, O'Neil, Hollingshead, Holman, & Moore, 1994) .
Theoretically, one way to examine whether people are comparatively optimistic about the future is to have them estimate the likelihood of all possible events. Comparative optimism for the future is demonstrated if people show comparative optimism for the majority of events. However, the universe of imaginable desirable and undesirable events is unlimited and researchers cannot construct a list of events that contains them all. One might argue that researchers have already sampled an acceptable variety of events and that researchers merely need to tabulate the results of the existing studies to determine whether comparative optimism characterizes the way people actually think about the future. It is clear that the vast majority of studies show comparative optimism (for a few exceptions, see Dolinski, Gromski, & Zawisza, 1987; Morrison, Ager, & Willock, 1999) . In addition, whereas multi-event studies often include some events that fail to provoke comparative optimism, they typically report comparative optimism for the majority of events.
However, there is another reason to believe that comparative optimism may not be as ubiquitous as commonly believed, a reason grounded in the events investigators have typically sampled in their research. An examination of the literature suggests that researchers have particularly sampled common desirable events and rare undesirable events, the very kinds of Comparative optimism 5 events that are likely to produce comparative optimism. For example, in his seminal study on comparative optimism, Weinstein (1980) examined desirable future events that were likely common in his sample of college students, events such as owning your own home, liking your postgraduation job, and having a starting salary greater than $10,000. In contrast, he generally examined undesirable future events that were likely rare in his sample of college students, events such as having a drinking problem, attempting suicide, and experiencing a heart attack before age 40. In addition, some researchers have explicitly examined events known to elicit comparative optimism, often because they were interested in examining causes or moderators of the effect rather than in demonstrating the generality of the effect (e.g., Darvill & Johnson, 1991; Davidson & Prkachin, 1997; Harris, Middleton, & Joiner, 2000; Kulik & Mahler, 1987; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Rothman, Klein, & Weinstein, 1996; Weinstein, 1983; Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982 ). An unintended side-effect may be an inflated perception of the robustness and ubiquity of comparative optimism.
When viewed collectively, these pieces of evidence have led some researchers to reevaluate the pervasiveness of comparative optimism. As noted by Blanton et al. (2001) , comparative optimism may only seem general because "the social psychological literature, which focuses primarily on the common sources of optimism, has not adequately explored common sources of pessimism" (p. 1627). Similarly, Chambers and Windschitl (2004) stated that "comparative optimism effects… are less global than once thought" (p. 834) and Kruger and Burrus (2004, p. 339) noted that comparative optimism "is not as ubiquitous as once thought" (p. 339). In their view, "Perhaps the most important question… is whether people tend to be unrealistically optimistic about the future" (Kruger & Burrus, 2004, p. 339) .
Reexamining Future Outlooks
The traditional approach has one additional limitation. In most studies of comparative optimism, participants provide likelihood ratings for hypothetical events generated by researchers. Even if these events are representative for all possible events, they are not Comparative optimism 6 necessarily the ones people think about when they contemplate their future. As such, the traditional approach tells us whether people are comparatively optimistic about the events chosen by researchers but not whether people are comparatively optimistic about their personal future. To address the latter question we need to know what events occupy people's thoughts and how they feel about those events.
To examine whether people expect that their future will be better than the future of other people, we used a novel method inspired by the work of Newby-Clark and Ross (2003) .
These authors examined the events participants generated when asked to list events that were likely to happen. Participants almost exclusively listed desirable events (Study 1) and desirable events came to mind more quickly than undesirable ones (Study 2 & 3). In addition, when asked to generate events without the constraint that the events must be likely, people indicated that the desirable events they listed were more likely to occur in their life than were the undesirable events they listed (Study 4). Newby-Clark and Ross (2003), using their freelisting task, thus showed that people are generally optimistic about their personal futures.
They did not, however, reveal whether people are comparatively optimistic.
The Newby-Clark and Ross (2003) study suggests two ways of addressing whether people are comparatively optimistic. First, we can ask participants to generate events that they believe may happen in their future versus in the average other's future, and ask them to indicate whether they view these events as desirable or undesirable. If people list more desirable events and fewer undesirable events as possible in their future than the average person's future, then we have some evidence that comparative optimism characterizes the way people generally think about their future.
Second, we can have participants estimate the likelihood that the events they list will occur in their life and the average person's life. Just as with the traditional approach, we can examine whether people are comparatively optimistic in these likelihood estimates. However, the crucial difference from the traditional approach is that this approach directs participants to Comparative optimism 7 provide likelihood estimates for events that they spontaneously list. If people show comparative optimism for these spontaneously listed events, then we have evidence that comparative optimism characterizes the likelihood estimates for events that people spontaneously think about when thinking of the future.
Together, the two procedures test whether people are generally comparatively optimistic about the future. If people list more desirable events and/or fewer undesirable events for themselves than for others, and if they rate the desirable events as more likely and the undesirable events as less likely for themselves than the average person, then we would have compelling evidence that people are truly comparatively optimistic about the future.
If participants are directed to rate the self-generated events' controllability as well as their desirability, we could also test the ecological validity of the common finding that participants show greater comparative optimism for controllable than non-controllable events.
Three previous studies on comparative optimism directed participants to generate future events (Brinthaupt, Moreland, & Levine, 1991; Higgins et al., 1997; Zakay, 1996) . However, each of these studies constrained the type of events participants could list and thus do not reveal the events participants spontaneously think about when asked to contemplate their future. Higgins et al. (1997) only examined undesirable events. Zakay (1996) had participants list events within specific categories (e.g., desirable/controllable) and had a second group of participants make likelihood estimates. Brinthaupt et al. (1991) examined judgments about one specific behavior -joining a campus group. None of these studies examined whether comparative optimism characterizes the way that people generally think about the future.
Overview of the study
Participants listed ten possible life events in their future (self-listing) or in the future of the average person (other-listing), then rated the controllability and the desirability of each event (on 7-point scales). Next, participants estimated the likelihood that the events would Comparative optimism 8 occur in their life or the life of the average student their age and sex. If comparative optimism characterizes how people think about the future, then participants should list more desirable events and fewer undesirable events in the self-listing condition than in the other-listing condition. Moreover, they should report that desirable events are more likely to happen to them than to the average other and that undesirable events are less likely to happen to them than to the average other.
Method

Participants
Participants were Belgian Dutch-speaking students (129 women, 25 men), aged 17 to 24 (M = 18) who took part to fulfill a course requirement and were randomly assigned to conditions.
Materials and Procedure
The study was run in groups of about 50 participants by an experimenter blind to conditions. The instructions directed participants to list ten important life events that could happen in their future (self-listing condition) or in the future of the average student of the same age, sex, and major (other-listing condition). The instructions in the self-listing condition read: "Your first task is to list 10 events that may occur in your future and that would strongly affect your life if you experienced them. We are interested in future events so please do not list events that have already happened to you and that you believe will not recur.
Describe the events clearly and concisely." The instructions in the other-listing condition read:
"Your first task is to list 10 events that may occur in the future of the average student of your age, gender, and major and that would strongly affect his or her life if he or she experienced them. We are interested in future events so please do not list events that have already happened to him or to her and that you believe will not recur. Describe the events clearly and concisely."
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After listing the events, participants rated the events' desirability and controllability using 7-points scales (desirability: -3 = undesirable; 0 = neutral; 3 = desirable; controllability: -3 = uncontrollable; 0 = neither uncontrollable, nor controllable; 3 = controllable). Finally, participants reported the likelihood that each event would happen to them and to the average student of their age, gender, and major (0 = the event will certainly not happen; 100 = the event will certainly happen)
1 .
We examined comparative optimism in the events listed using a between-subjects manipulation and in likelihood estimates using a within-subjects manipulation of the target individual (self-others). We did so for two reasons. First, we wished to avoid repetitiveness in the experimental tasks and hence to avoid potential boredom and fatigue in the participants.
Second, we wished to avoid demand characteristics leading participants to list identical events for themselves and others. It should be noted that the definition of comparative optimism by no means implies that the phenomenon should be studied within-subjects. For instance, Harris and Middleton (1994) showed that comparative optimism in likelihood estimates occurs in between-subjects designs as well as in within-subjects designs.
Keeping with general practice, we counterbalanced the order such that half of the participants estimated likelihoods for the average student first and half estimated likelihoods for self first. We kept the controllability-likelihood task order constant to avoid that participants were distracted by accidentally noticing that other participants were working on a different task. Previous studies typically do not find or do not report order effects of controllability and probability ratings (e.g., Darvill & Johnson, 1991) , or suggest that rating another's control over events reduces rather than enhances comparative optimism for these events whereas rating personal control does not affect comparative optimism (Hoorens & Smits, 2001) . If anything, therefore, rating the events' controllability before estimating their likelihood should reduce rather than enhance comparative optimism, thereby providing a more stringent test of our hypothesis. Exploring the nature of the events. Merely showing that participants were comparatively optimistic in the events they listed does not reveal whether the optimism was due to participants listing more desirable events and fewer undesirable events for themselves, or to participants simply rating the same events as more desirable when listing for themselves vs. the average student. To examine if participants listed more desirable and fewer undesirable events for themselves than for the average student, we used participants' desirability ratings to
Comparative optimism 11 group events into three categories: undesirable events (rating < 0), neutral events (rating = 0), and desirable events (rating > 0). To examine if any comparative optimism in the number of events participants listed depended on the controllability of the events, we also used the controllability ratings to group the events into three groups: uncontrollable events (rating < 0), neutral events (rating = 0), and controllable events (rating > 0). We then calculated the cell means of all desirability by controllability combinations and subjected these cell means to an condition. We thus found comparative optimism in the number of desirable, neutral, and undesirable events participants expected. Table 1 about here
------------------------
The target by desirability interaction was qualified by a three-way interaction with controllability, F(4, 608) = 3.2, p = .01,  2 = .02. Participants in the self-listing condition listed more controllable/desirable events, t(152) = 2.4, p = .02, d = .4, fewer controllable/undesirable events, t(152) = 2.8, p = .006, d = .5, and fewer controllable/neutral events, t(152) = 2.6, p = .01, d = .5, than did participants in the other-listing condition.
Participants in the self-listing and other-listing condition did not differ in the number of Comparative optimism in likelihood estimates. To examine whether participants displayed comparative optimism in their likelihood estimates, we created difference scores that reflected comparative optimism: self-minus-other for desirable events and other-minusself for undesirable events. Using one-sample t-tests, we examined if these comparative optimism scores were significantly different from zero. Neutral events were dropped from the analysis.
We found comparative optimism in participants' ratings when we collapsed across listing target and type of event, t(150) = 4.25, p < .0001, M = 3.9, SD = 11.3, d = .5.
Consistent with predictions, participants on average reported that their future will be better overall than other people's future. Moreover, this comparative optimism occurred both for events that participants listed as possible in their future, t(75) = 3.9, p = .0002, M = 5.5, SD = 12.5, d = .6, and for events that they listed as possible in the average other's future t(74) = 2.0, p = .05, M = 2.3, SD = 9.9, d = .3.
Discussion
Are people comparatively optimistic about the future? Our study strongly suggests that they are. We found comparative optimism in the number of controllable desirable, neutral, and undesirable events participants listed as possible in their future and in the average person's future. Participants listed more desirable events and fewer neutral and undesirable events in their future than in the average other's future. At the same time, we found comparative optimism in participants' likelihood estimates for these events.
Our findings not only show that people are comparatively optimistic about the future, but also that people's optimism is not limited to comparative judgments. After reviewing the Comparative optimism 13 literature on comparative optimism, Chambers and Windschitl (2004) noted that "One could argue that perhaps above-average and comparative-optimism beliefs (along with belowaverage and comparative-pessimism beliefs) exist only when a researcher asks a respondent to provide a comparative judgment, because the source of these biases are introduced only within the judgment process itself." (p. 832). Our study suggests that comparative optimism is not an artifact of a particular methodology or the events selected by researchers. Of course, our findings do not imply that comparative-optimism effects in studies of relative likelihood estimates may not be inflated by the events being presented and the type of responses being elicited. However, we suggest that comparative optimism cannot fully be reduced to such artifacts. It should be noted that participants frequently listed events often used in traditional studies of comparative optimism. As such, our findings strengthen the confidence researchers can place on previous studies.
Limitations and directions for further research
Our study has several limitations that suggest directions for new research. First, like most studies of comparative judgments, we examined undergraduates and one may wonder whether the results generalize to other groups. It is noteworthy that a number of studies have shown comparative optimism in non-students samples (see Bauman & Siegel, 1987; Dalziel & Soames Job, 1997; Finn & Bragg, 1986; Weinstein, 1987) . However, these studies used the traditional approach to assessing comparative optimism. It remains to be seen whether comparative optimism characterizes the spontaneous future outlooks of non-student populations.
Second, we found comparative optimism when participants were instructed to think about important life events (i.e., "events that would strongly affect your life if you experienced them"). Of course, people are not always focused on important events when they think about the future and it is possible that our findings might be different had we not limited participants to think only about future events. It is also possible that the events participants list
Comparative optimism 14 for themselves vs. the average person may differ in importance and this difference might influence our findings.
Third, it is unknown the degree to which the two forms of comparative optimism represent the same latent construct. Research on how the two forms of comparative optimism are related may yield three patterns of results. First, it may show that the two forms are independent. Such a finding would add to the handful of studies suggesting that there are multiple, relatively independent types of comparative optimism (Hoorens, 1996; Nezlek & Zebrowski, 2001 
Conclusion
The event-specificity of comparative optimism in likelihood estimates has prompted researchers to assume that there is no reason to think that people view their future in a relatively rosy manner. Using a new methodology, we found that people believe that desirable events will be more numerous and that undesirable as well as neutral events will be less numerous in their future than in the average other's future. They also think that the desirable events are more likely and that the undesirable events are less likely to happen to them than to others. These findings suggest that people are truly comparatively optimistic about the future.
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Footnotes 1 A reviewer of a previous version of this manuscript suggested that the word "average" may be interpreted as having pejorative connotations. However, the Dutch word that we used in this study ("gemiddeld") has no such connotations.
2 The ANOVA yielded some additional effects that were not relevant to our hypothesis: a main effect of desirability, F(2,304) = 144.7, p < .0001,  2 = .9, a main effect of controllability, F(2,304) = 63.9, p < .0001,  2 = .4, and an interaction of desirability with controllability, F(4,608) = 122.9, p < .0001,  2 = .8. Because these were not directly relevant to our hypothesis and because they were hard to interpret due the narrow definition of the neutral categories, we do not discuss them further. However, it is noteworthy that controllable/desirable events (34.3%) and uncontrollable/undesirable events (24.0%) made up the majority of events listed, and that participants listed few controllable/undesirable events (9.2%) and uncontrollable/desirable events (7.1%). It is also noteworthy to consider the number of participants who did not list events for a given category. Confirming the preponderance of controllable positive events and uncontrollable negative events, 93% of all participants listed at least one controllable/desirable event and 92% listed at least one uncontrollable/undesirable event. Conversely, only 49% of participants listed at least one controllable/undesirable event and only 41% listed at least one uncontrollable/desirable event.
Comparative optimism 20 Other-Listing .6 (0.9) .1 (0.4) 2.3 (1.5) Total Self-Listing 5.6 (2.0) .6 (0.9) 3.8 (2.1)
Other-Listing 4.4 (2.1) 1.1 (1.4) 4.4 (2.2)
